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Constitutional Law-Civil Rights-PRIVATE SCHOOLS PROHIBITED FROM
EXCLUDING QUALIFIED CHILDREN SOLELY BECAUSE THEY ARE BLACK-
Runyon v. McCrary, 96 S. Ct. 2586 (1976).
All major school desegregation decisions through 1975 involved "public"
schools, and were based on provisions of the fourteenth amendment.' This
constitutional remedy, however, requires the presence of "state action"2
before being triggered. Commencing with the Supreme Court's earliest
public school desegregation decisions,3 and accelerating with the finding
of affirmative duties of southern school districts to desegregate,4 private
educational institutions following racially exclusionary admittance poli-
cies were founded.5 Such private discrimination generally has been con-
sidered to be beyond the scope of the fourteenth amendment.' Moreover,
parents that patronize such institutions have sought support in Supreme
Court cases which confer constitutional protection upon familial decisions
whether to bear, 7 and how to rear,' their children. However, these rights
have not been held to be exempt from reasonable governmental regula-
tion.9
1. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
2. The fourteenth amendment is addressed to the states, not to private citizens. State
statutes or local ordinances mandating segregated school systems have been the most obvious
examples of "state action." Public funding of educational institutions and legislative control
are further manifestations of state action against which the amendment's remedies could be
applied.
3. Brown v. Board of Educ., 349 U.S. 294 (1955); Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483
(1954).
4. Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenberg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971); Alexander v. Holmes
Cty. Bd. of Educ., 396 U.S. 19 (1969); Monroe v. Board of Comm'rs, 391 U.S. 450 (1968);
Raney v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 443 (1968); Green v. County School Bd., 391 U.S. 430
(1968); Bradley v. School Bd., 382 U.S. 103 (1965); Board of School Comm'rs v. Davis, 84 S.
Ct. 10 (1963).
5. The Southern Independent School Association, an intervenor in the case herein dis-
cussed, is composed of six state private school associations and represents 395 private schools.
It was stipulated that many of these schools deny admission to blacks.
6. The equal protection clause was designed as a safeguard against acts of the state, and
not against the conduct of private individuals or groups. United States v. Classic, 313 U.S.
299 (1941).
7. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972); Stanley v.
Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
8. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 213 (1972); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510
(1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923). The Supreme Court has conceded that the
right to privacy which protects child-bearing decisions (see cases cited in note 7 supra) and
the liberty assurance which protects child-rearing decisions (see cases cited supra this note)
may be "no more than verbal variations of a single constitutional right." Runyon v. McCrary,
96 S. Ct. 2586, 2598 n.15 (1976) (dictum).
9. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 154 (1973); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 232-34 (1972);
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In Runyon v. McCrary,'" the Supreme Court recently drew upon the
thirteenth amendment and the Civil Rights Act of 1866" to reach and
remedy the private racial discrimination manifested by the exclusionary
policies of certain private schools. The principal questions raised were (1)
whether the Act prohibits private, commercially operated, nonsectarian
schools from excluding qualified children solely because they are black;
and (2) whether, if so, the Act is constitutional as applied. The relevant
portion of the Act states that "[a]ll persons within the jurisdiction of the
United States shall have the same right in every State . . . to make and
enforce contracts . . . as is enjoyed by white citizens ... "I'
The respondents and original plaintiffs were two black children who
sought enrollment at Bobbe's Private School in Arlington, Virginia. One
of the children had also sought admission to Fairfax-Brewster School in
Fairfax County, Virginia. Both schools'3 advertised in the telephone direc-
tory and used general mail solicitations addressed to "Resident" to attract
students. Both children through their parents responded to the brochures
mailed to their addresses, but were denied admission on racial grounds.
The district court which heard the suit brought on behalf of the black
children held that 42 U.S.C. § 1981 makes such racially discriminatory
admission policies illegal.'4 It enjoined both schools and the members of
the intervenor Southern Independent School Association from discriminat-
ing against applicants on the basis of race.'5
The Fourth Circuit, affirming the district court's determinations of law,
stated that 42 U.S.C. § 1981 is a "limitation upon private discrimination,
and its enforcement in the context of this case is not a deprivation of any
right of free association or of privacy of the defendants, of the intervenor
or their pupils or patrons."" The court of appeals further found that the
Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 458 (1972); Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564 (1969);
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 497-98 (1965) (Goldberg, J., concurring); Pierce v.
Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 402 (1923).
10. 96 S. Ct. 2586 (1976).
11. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981-82 (1970) (originally enacted as Act of April 9, 1866, ch. 31, § 1, 14
Stat. 27).
12. Act of April 9, 1866, ch. 31, § 1, 14 Stat. 27, presently codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1981
(1970).
13. Bobbe's School opened with five students in 1958 and grew to two hundred by 1972. It
has operated a day camp since 1967, averaging one hundred students per year. The Fairfax-
Brewster School began in 1955 and had two hundred twenty-three students by 1972. Its day
camp, begun in 1956, had two hundred thirty-six attendees in 1972. Neither school has ever
accepted a black child into any of its programs. Runyon v. McCrary, 96 S. Ct. 2586, 2591
(1976).
14. Gonzales v. Fairfax-Brewster School, Inc., 363 F. Supp. 1200 (E.D. Va. 1973).
15. Id. at 1205.
16. McCrary v. Runyon, 515 F.2d 1082, 1086 (4th Cir. 1975) (en banc).
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relationship the parents had sought to enter into with the schools was
undeniably contractual in nature within the meaning of section 1981.
7
The Supreme Court noted that it is now well established" that section
1981 prohibits racial discrimination in the making and enforcement of
private contracts." Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co. 20 had held that Congress
intended through section 1 of the Civil Rights Act of 186621 to prohibit "all
racial discrimination, private and public, in the sale . . . of property,
2
and that this was within Congress' power pursuant to section 2 of the
thirteenth amendment. 2 The Court stated in Runyon that its ruling was
based on Jones:"'
Just as in Jones a Negro's § 1 [of the Civil Rights Act of 1866] right to
purchase property on equal terms with whites was violated when a private
person refused to sell to the prospective purchaser solely because he was a
Negro, so also a Negro's right to 'make and enforce contracts' is violated if a
private offeror refuses to extend to a Negro, solely because he is a Negro, the
same opportunity to enter into contracts as he extends to white offerees. 25
17. Id. at 1087.
18. See Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 421 U.S. 454, 459-60 (1975); Tillman v.
Wheaton-Haven Recreation Ass'n, 410 U.S. 431, 439-40 (1973). But cf. Jones v. Alfred H.
Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 441-43 n.78 (1968).
19. Runyon v. McCrary, 96 S. Ct. 2586, 2593 (1976).
20. 392 U.S. 409 (1968).
21. The portion of section 1 of the Act at issue in Jones has been codified at 42 U.S.C. §
1982 (1970). Both section 1981 and section 1982, therefore, were derived from section 1 of the
1866 Act. See Runyon v. McCrary, 96 S. Ct. 2586, 2593-94 & n.8 (1976); Tillman v. Wheaton-
Haven Recreation Ass'n, 410 U.S. 431, 439 (1973). This factor accounts for the substantial
precedential value accorded Jones as the Court in Runyon decided whether section 1981
reached acts of private discrimination.
22. 392 U.S. at 437.
23. Id. at 440-41.
24. The statutory holding in Jones found that the Civil Rights Act of 1866 "was designed
to do just what its terms suggest: to prohibit all racial discrimination, whether or not under
color of law, with respect to the rights enumerated therein - including the right to purchase
or lease property." 392 U.S. 409, 436 (1968). Tillman v. Wheaton-Haven Recreation Ass'n,
410 U.S. 431, 439 (1973), confirming the applicability of Jones to section 1981, noted that
"[tihe operative language of both § 1981 and § 1982 is traceable to the Act of April 9, 1866,
c. 31, § 1, 14 Stat. 27." Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 421 U.S. 454, 459-60 (1975),
noted that section 1981 "relates primarily to racial discrimination in the making and enforce-
ment of contracts," and "affords a federal remedy against discrimination in private employ-
ment on the basis of race."
25. Runyon v. McCrary, 96 S. Ct. 2586, 2594 (1976). The petitioner schools had relied on
a statement in Norwood v. Harrison, 413 U.S. 455, 469 (1973) (emphasis in original), that
private bias [in the admission of students to private schools] is not barred by the
Constitution, nor does it invoke any sanction of laws, but neither may it call on the
Constitution for material aid from the State.
1976]
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The precedential value of Jones" and the cases that followed it" seems
to have been the controlling factor in the Court's determination in
Runyon.28 One Justice who voted with the majority stated that he would
have been persuaded by the dissent "[i]f the slate were clean. 29 Another
Justice among the majority noted he followed a "line of authority which I
firmly believe to have been incorrectly decided."3
An application of section 1981 to private school discrimination could be
challenged as in conflict with the constitutional rights of free association
and privacy, 3' a parent's right to direct the education of his children 2
and/or the free exercise of religion.33 The Court in Runyon addressed each
of these areas of challenge.
Recognizing an associational right of parents to send their children to
educational institutions that promote the belief that racial segregation is
desirable,34 the Runyon Court decided that it did not follow that the
practice of excluding racial minorities from admission to such institutions
is also protected by the first amendment."
The Court also refused to extend 3 the due process rationale in cases
following Meyer v. Nebraska,37 since the issues presented in Runyon were
They argued that this statement meant that section 1981 did not proscribe private racial
discrimination that interfered with the formation of contracts for educational services. But
the Court noted that Norwood had not concerned the applicability of section 1981 and had
furthermore stated that "some private discrimination is subject to special remedial legis-
lation in certain circumstances under § 2 of the Thirteenth Amendment .... " 96 S. Ct. at
2594 n.9, citing Norwood v. Harrison, 413 U.S. 455, 470 (1973).
26. Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968).
27. Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 421 U.S. 454, 459-60 (1975); Tillman v.
Wheaton-Haven Recreation Ass'n, 410 U.S. 431, 439-40 (1973); Sullivan v. Little Hunting
Park, Inc., 396 U.S. 229, 236-37 (1969).
28. See the majority opinion written by Justice Stewart, 96 S. Ct. at 2590. Justice Powell
concurred: "The applicability of § 1981 to private contracts has been considered maturely
and recently, and I do not feel free to disregard these precedents." 96 S. Ct. at 2602. Justice
Stevens also concurred, based on his "interest in stability and orderly development of the
law." 96 S. Ct. at 2604.
29. 96 S. Ct. at 2601 (Powell, J., concurring).
30. 96 S. Ct. at 2603 (Stevens, J., concurring).
31. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
32. See note 8 supra.
33. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
34. See NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963); NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 460
(1958).
35. 96 S. Ct. at 2596. See Norwood v. Harrison, 413 U.S. 455, 469-70 (1973).
36. 96 S. Ct. at 2597.
37. 262 U.S. 390 (1923). See the cases cited in note 8 supra.
[Vol. 11:221
RECENT DECISIONS
deemed not to encompass the liberty interests held by parents to send their
children to private schools of their choice.38
Since the Court determined that the free exercise clause of the first
amendment was not involved in these cases,3" the enactment of section
1981, pursuant to section 2 of the thirteenth amendment, was held to be
an exercise of the federal legislative power consistent with the first and
fourteenth amendments. Acknowledging that parental child-rearing deci-
sions concerning the manner in which children are to be educated are
closely akin to the privacy rights protected in Griswold v. Connecticut"
and Roe v. Wade,4 the Court went on to hold that strict constitutional
limitations on government interference with the child-bearing decision
should not be extended to apply to regulation of child-rearing decisions.,
In order to understand the scope of the decision in Runyon, it is neces-
sary to note what it does not affect. The two schools directly involved were
nonsectarian and engaged in advertising their programs through the public
media. " Apparently, any Caucasian child who wished to enroll would be
accepted. Beyond certain minimum objective requirements, no other basis
than race was a factor in rejecting or selecting applicants.4 The schools
involved were private only in the sense that they were managed by private
individuals and did not receive direct public funding. "Their actual and
potential constituency, however, was more public than private. '4 5 It ap-
pears that the Court was swayed here by the commercial nature of the
enterprises involved and the general offering of the prospective contractual
relationship.4"
Members of the majority seemed determined to limit the scope of the
Runyon decision from its inception. Justice Stewart, writing for the major-
ity, was quick to assert that the case presented no question as to the right
38. 96 S. Ct. at 2597.
39. Id. at 2592 n.6.
40. 381 U.S. 479, 484-86 (1965).
41. 410 U.S. 113, 152-53 (1973). See note 8 supra.
42. A person's decision whether to bear a child and a parent's decision concerning the
manner in which his child is to be educated may fairly be characterized as exercises
of familial rights and responsibilities. But it does not follow that because government
is largely or even entirely precluded from regulating the child-bearing decision, it is
similarly restricted by the Constitution from regulating the implementation of paren-
tal decisions concerning a child's education.
Runyon v. McCrary, 96 S. Ct. 2586, 2598 (1976).
43. The Yellow Pages and general mailings to "Resident" were employed. 96 S. Ct. at 2591.
44. Id. at 2602-03.
45. McCrary v. Runyon, 515 F.2d 1082, 1089 (4th Cir. 1975).
46. Runyon v. McCrary, 96 S. Ct. 2586, 2603 (1976).
1976]
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of a private social organization to limit its membership on racial or nonra-
cial grounds." Neither was there presented any issue of the right of a
private school to limit its student body to children of one sex or to adher-
ents of a particular religious faith.48 The case is also not applicable to
private sectarian schools that practice racial exclusion on religious
grounds ."
Justice Powell's concurring opinion is dedicated to limiting and defining
the scope of the decision."0 He notes that a small kindergarten or music
class extending personal invitations to preidentified students would not be
affected by Runyon.5 ' The ruling, its predecessors and section 1981 gener-
ally reach acts which are "private" in the sense that they involve no state
action. But the statute and cases do not extend to reach acts which are
"private" in the sense that they are not part of "a commercial relationship
offered generally or widely. '52 Section 1981 does not require an intrusive
investigation into the motives of every refusal to contract by a private
individual.53 There are certain personal contractual relationships which
would invoke long-respected associational rights.54
Justice White, in dissent, argued that section 1981 outlaws any legal rule
disabling any person from making or enforcing a contract, but does not
prohibit private racially motivated refusals to contract.55 The minority
further argued that what was conferred by the statute was the right (which
was already enjoyed by whites) to make contracts with other "willing"
parties and to enforce those contracts in court. Since section 1981 grants
blacks only the "same rights" as white citizens, it confers no right to force
a contract with an "unwilling" party.56 Language in the dissent demon-
47. Id. at 2592.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. "Although the range of consequences suggested by the dissenting opinion ... go far
beyond what we hold today, I am concerned that our decision not be construed more broadly
than would be justified." Id. at 2602 (Powell, J., concurring).
51. Id. at 2602-03.
52. Id. at 2603.
53. Id. at 2602; McCrary v. Runyon, 515 F.2d 1082, 1088-89 (4th Cir. 1975).
54. "Where the offeror selects those with whom he desires to bargain on an individualized
basis, or where the contract is the foundation of a close association (such as, for example,
that between an employer and a private tutor, babysitter, or housekeeper), there is reason to
assume that, although the choice made by the offeror is selective, it reflects 'a purpose of
exclusiveness' other than the desire to bar members of the Negro race." Runyon v. McCrary,
96 S. Ct. 2586, 2602 (Powell, J., concurring).
55. Id. at 2604 (White, J., dissenting)(tracing the legislative history, claiming that section
1981 is not based on the thirteenth amendment, and that Jones and related cases are inappli-
cable).
56. Id. at 2605 (White, J., dissenting).
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strates the belief by Justices White and Rehnquist that Runyon could be
made applicable to private segregated associations 7 and that the Court
was legislating, not interpreting."
The words of caution and express limitations stated within the Court's
opinion and the concurring opinions suggest that Runyon may not have the
sweeping effect anticipated by the dissent. Certainly, it is binding on the
true "segregation academies" which have proliferated in many areas of the
nation. Where the sole basis of selectivity is one of racial animus, private
school admission policies will fall under the proscription of section 1981.
Moreover, private schools cannot exclude persons of any race solely on the
basis of their racial characteristics or background.59 Thus, a nonsectarian
private school with an entirely black student population could not deny
admission to white applicants if the only exclusionary factor was race.
The Court's notation that racial exclusion motivated by religious beliefs
was not at issue might be interpreted as indicating a hesitancy to extend
Runyon to the point of barring such exclusion based on religious beliefs."0
It is likely, however, that such religious beliefs would have to be shown to
be long held and not of recent origin."'
Certain private social organizations could be covered by the type of
reasoning enunciated by the majority in Runyon. Although specifically not
addressed to that issue, 2 obvious analogies can be drawn between such
organizations and the private schools in Runyon. Social organizations and
private clubs which solicit memberships from the general public would
present similar factual situations as that in Runyon. Widespread solicita-
tion of the public coupled with an exclusionary policy with regard to a
specific racial group would likely be held violative of the section 1981
"right to contract." Apparently, more exclusive social organizations would
be beyond the ruling of this case. Social organizations applying extensive
requirements beyond race to all racial groups would not have the same
57. Id. at 2613-14.
58. Id. at 2614.
59. See McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 96 S. Ct. 2574 (1976) (addressing the
question of whether section 1981 prohibits racial discrimination in private employment
against whites as well as nonwhites). In holding that section 1981 does apply, the Court relies
on the wording "[afl persons [within the jurisdiction of the United States] shall have the
r.. fight ... to make and enforce contracts." Id. at 2576 (emphasis added).
60. A confrontation between the free exercise clause of the first amendment and the thir-
teenth amendment, it is suggested, would result in a ruling opposite from that laid down in
Runyon.
61. The two schools here involved could not, obviously, retain their exclusionary policies
by merely claiming religious beliefs as a new basis.
62. 96 S. Ct. at 2592.
1976]
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"public" quality as the schools involved in this case. 3 But social organiza-
tions which open their memberships to "every white person within the
geographical area, there being no selective element other than race,"64 have
previously been proscribed.
A key phrase in the Runyon holding may be "commercially operated."6 5
Conceivably this could be construed to exclude "nonprofit" schools and
social organizations from the ruling. However, the intervening Southern
Independent School Association alleged that it was an association of pri-
vate, nonprofit schools.6 It is interesting to note that the Supreme Court
decision mentioned that the association was nonprofit, but did not remark
on the status of its individual member schools. 7
Certainly private social organizations that practice racially exclusionary
policies based on religious grounds are not likely to be affected by Runyon.
These would probably have not only the "private club" exemption" as a
shield, but also the free exercise clause of the first amendment.
Whether Runyon v. McCrary will be expanded will depend on the type
of institutions next challenged as violative of section 1981. The factors to
be scrutinized will apparently include: (1) the degree of "privacy" involved
as measured by solicitation and advertising or lack thereof; (2) whether the
institution is sectarian or nonsectarian; (3) whether racial exclusions are
based on religious grounds; (4) whether the institution is commercially-
operated and (5) the factors of selectivity used. 9
Craig S. Cooley
63. The Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000a(e) (1970), contains a "private club or
other [private] establishment" exemption which could operate to restrict the scope of section
1981. The Supreme Court did not reach this issue. 96 S. Ct. at 2592.
64. Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, Inc., 396 U.S. 229, 236 (1969). See also Tillman v.
Wheaton-Haven Recreation Ass'n, 410 U.S. 431, 438 (1973).
65. Runyon v. McCrary, 96 S. Ct. 2586, 2593 (1976).
66. McCrary v. Runyon, 515 F.2d 1082, 1084 (4th Cir. 1975).
67. See Runyon v. McCrary, 96 S. Ct. 2586, 2591 (1976).
68. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000a(e) (1970).
69. No question was presented as to the right of a private school to limit its student body
to boys or to girls since section 1981 on its face reaches only racial discrimination. 96 S. Ct.
at 2592.
For articles predating the Supreme Court's decision see Note, Federal Power to Regulate
Private Discrimination: The Revival of the Enforcement Clauses of the Reconstruction Era
Amendments, 74 COLUM. L. REV. 449 (1974); Note, Desegregation of Private Schools: Section
1981 as an Alternative to State Action, 62 GEO. L.J. 1363 (1974); Note, The Desegregation of
Private Schools: Is Section 1981 the Answer?, 48 N.Y.U.L. REV. 1147 (1973); Comment, Jones
v. Alfred H. Mayer Co. Extended to Private Education: Gonzales v. Fairfax-Brewster School,
Inc., 122 U. PA. L. REV. 471 (1973); Note, Segregation Academies and State Action, 82 YALE
L.J. 1436 (1973).
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